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Abstract
Attribution methods have been developed to explain the decision of a machine learning model on a given
input. We use the Integrated Gradient method for finding attributions to define the causal neighborhood of
an input by incrementally masking high attribution features. We study the robustness of machine learning
models on benign and adversarial inputs in this neighborhood. Our study indicates that benign inputs are
robust to the masking of high attribution features but adversarial inputs generated by the state-of-the-art
adversarial attack methods such as DeepFool, FGSM, CW and PGD, are not robust to such masking. Further,
our study demonstrates that this concentration of high-attribution features responsible for the incorrect
decision is more pronounced in physically realizable adversarial examples. This difference in attribution
of benign and adversarial inputs can be used to detect adversarial examples. Such a defense approach is
independent of training data and attack method, and we demonstrate its effectiveness on digital and physically
realizable perturbations.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models have been wildly successful in applications such as computer vision (Krizhevsky et al.,
2017), natural language processing, speech recognition, and automatic control. These models have reached
human-level performance on several benchmarks (He et al., 2015; Xiong et al., 2017). But the adoption of
these models in safety-critical or high-security applications is inhibited due to two major concerns: their
brittleness to adversarial attack methods that can make imperceptible modification to inputs and trigger wrong
decisions (Szegedy et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2016a), and the lack of interpretability (Gunning, 2017).
Significant progress has also been made towards adversarial robustness (Papernot et al., 2016b; Madry et al.,
2017; Engstrom et al., 2018) and explainability (Li & Yu, 2015; Yi et al., 2016; Sundararajan et al., 2017), and
a few recent theoretical studies (Kilbertus et al., 2018; Chalasani et al., 2018) indicate a strong connection
between these two issues.
In this paper, we investigate this connection between the resilience to adversarial perturbations and the
attribution-based explanation of individual decisions by a machine learning model. Our study is motivated by
Kahneman’s decomposition (Kahneman & Egan, 2011) of cognition into two layers: System 1, or the intuitive
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system, and System 2, or the deliberate system. The original machine learning model represents the System 1
and the attribution analysis presented in this paper is the deliberative System 2 that can detect inconsistencies
in System 1 by analyzing the attribution generated by the model on the input. Our central hypothesis is that
adversarial inputs are imperceptibly similar to benign inputs and are still able to trigger wrong decisions
because of a relatively small number of features with high attribution in the machine learning model. This
concentration of causal attributions is central to their physical realizability and perceptual indistinguishably
from benign inputs.
Figure 1: The top row shows an original yawl image and the
bottom row shows the adversarial input obtained by adding
an adversarial patch (Brown et al., 2017) which causes mis-
classification. The leftmost image is the input, next to it is
the saliency map that shows the features (pixels) with positive
attributions (Szegedy et al., 2016), and the rightmost image
shows the pixels with top 2% attribution masked. People in the
boat are in the top 2% positive attribution features in original
image but not in the adversarial image. The saliency map
showing attributions are obtained using Integrated Gradient
method (Sundararajan et al., 2017)
The example in Figure 1 demonstrates the shift
in positive attributions and the corresponding quali-
tative change in saliency map due to the adversarial
perturbation. We observe a similar shift in features
with high magnitude attributions for the adversarial
examples generated by the state-of-the-art purely
digital attack methods such as DeepFool (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016), projected gradient descent
(PGD) (Madry et al., 2017), fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, 2014) and Carlini-
Wagner (CW) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
Adversarial perturbations often create a small
fraction of high-attribution features responsible for
the change in the output model without visible
change in the input. Consequently, it is possible
to identify an adversarial example by examining
inputs in its causal neighborhood obtained by
incrementally masking the features which have
high magnitude attributions. While benign inputs
are robust and the model does not change its
decision on the input in this neighborhood, the
decision of the model is not robust on the adver-
sarial examples. The localized nature of existing
physically realizable attacks naturally concentrates the high attribution features. The ease of detection of these
adversarial examples suggests a trade off in physical realizability and indistinguishability in attribution space.
We make the following novel contributions in this paper:
• We define a causal neighborhood of an input in the attribution space that can be used to measure the efficacy
of an adversarial attack beyond perceptual similarity or the commonly used Lp norms. Effective attack
methods should not just be able to fool the intuitive System 1 i.e. the machine learning model but also the
deliberative System 2 i.e. the attribution analysis presented here.
• We use attribution methods to analyze the robustness of benign as well as adversarial inputs by incrementally
masking high attribution features. Our empirical analysis includes digital attack methods such as DeepFool,
FGSM, CW and PGD, and physically realizable perturbations.
• We propose a defense layer based on Kahneman’s decomposition of cognition into intuitive System 1 and
deliberative System 2. This approach does not rely on analyzing training data such as manifold-based
defense (Ilyas et al., 2017; Jha et al., 2018), or statistical signature of the machine learning models such as
logit pairing (Engstrom et al., 2018), or methods that exploit the knowledge of specific attack for adversarial
training (Trame`r et al., 2017), or robust optimization with Lp norm bounds (Madry et al., 2017; Raghunathan
et al., 2018).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss relevant background and review related work in
Section 2. We present our analysis approach and derived defense against adversarial perturbation in Section 3.
The experimental results from our empirical analysis on MNIST and ILSVRC datasets using different attack
methods are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 by discussing the limitations of our approach,
and the salient findings of our study.
2 Background and Related Work
(Szegedy et al., 2013) first introduced adversarial examples using an L-BFGS method. These generated
adversarial images could be generalized to different training databases and models; however theyre very rarely
seen in test images. L-BFGS attack uses an expensive linear search method to obtain the optimal value, but
this method is time-consuming and impractical. (Goodfellow, 2014) proposed a fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) to generate faster adversarial images as compared to the L-BFGS method; this method performed
only a one-step gradient update at each pixel along the direction of the gradients sign. (Rozsa et al., 2016)
replaced the sign of the gradients with raw gradients and proposed a new method called fast gradient value
method. (Dong et al., 2018) applied momentum to FGSM, with adversarial images generated more iteratively.
The effectiveness and transferability improved by introducing momentum and by applying the ensembling
method and the one-step attack. (Kurakin et al., 2016) further extended FGSM to a targeted attack, where the
probability of the target class was maximized. This attack is also known as the one-step target class method.
Adversarial examples (Goodfellow, 2014) which produce incorrect decision from machine learning models
can be obtained using a number of techniques (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017; Carlini
& Wagner, 2017) which are now available in tools such as Cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2016a). While these
methods rely on diffused digital transformation of the input, physically realizable attacks in form of patches
or stickers that can be added to an image have also been developed. Adversarial patch (Brown et al., 2017)
and localized and visible adversarial noise(LaVAN) (Karmon et al., 2018b) methods generate patches that
are universal and can be used to attack any image and are targeted to force classifier to output a particular
output label. Their goal is to generate universal noise patches that can be physically printed and put on any
image, in either a black-box (when the attacked network is unknown) or white-box (when the attacked network
is known) setup. A related attack is proposed in (Karmon et al., 2018a) to investigate the blind-spots of
state-of-the-art image classifiers, and the kinds of noise that can cause them to misclassify. More diffused
universal adversarial digital perturbations (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) have also been proposed that can be
applied to any input. Further, the adversarial examples have been shown to transfer (Liu et al., 2016; Papernot
et al., 2017) across models making them agnostic to availability of model parameters and effective against even
ensemble approaches. In addition to these inference-time attacks, machine learning models have also been
shown to be susceptible to data poisoning attacks during training. Last few years of efforts to defend against
adversarial attacks have met with limited success. While empirical approaches such as logit pairing (Engstrom
et al., 2018) and defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b) have shown effectiveness against particular
attack methods, more principled techniques such as robust optimization (Raghunathan et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2019) are limited to perturbations with bounded Lp norm. This arms race between attacks and defenses
are not limited to computer vision, but are also applicable to audio and natural language processing.
A number of attribution techniques have been recently proposed in literature that assign positive and
negative importance to an input feature for a given decision of the machine learning model. Attributions
can correspond to the actual decision or to counterfactuals. Many prominent attribution methods are based
on the gradient of the predictor function with respect to the input (Simonyan et al., 2013; Selvaraju et al.,
2017; Sundararajan et al., 2017). These approaches have been extended to counterfactual analysis (Datta et al.,
2016) which has roots in cooperative game theory and revenue division. Counterfactual analysis is difficult
when the number of possible output labels is large. We restrict our study to analysis of the actual attribution.
Different attribution methods are compared in (Adebayo et al., 2018). The sensitivity of these attributions to
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Figure 2: The architecture of the proposed approach motivated by the two level Kahneman’s decomposition of cognition.
Typical machine learning models for classification perform anti-causal learning to determine the label from the input
instance. As noted by (Chalasani et al., 2018), such anti-causal reasoning lacks the natural continuity of causal mechanisms
and is often not robust. But we view this model as System 1 and use attribution methods (Integrated Gradient in our
experiments) to obtain features with positive and negative attributions. In this example with the MNIST dataset, we see that
the adversarial perturbation that causes misclassification of 9 into 4 also significantly changes the attributions. For example,
the top part of the perturbed 9 (misclassified as 4) has negative attribution. In deliberative System 2, we perform reasoning
in the causal direction, and mask the high attribution features (pixels in this case) to obtain a number of input instances in
the causal neighborhood of the original image. The original attributions are robust but the adversarial attributions are not
robust which causes the model to assign different labels to images in the causal neighborhood of adversarial examples.
perturbations in the input are studied in (Ghorbani et al., 2017) and adversarial attacks are presented to create
perceptively indistinguishable images with the same prediction label but different attributions. Their results
indicate that both System 1 and System 2 in our proposed approach can be independently attacked.
The goal of this paper is to combine both System 1 and System 2 to create a more resilient cognition model
than any one of them alone. This is motivated by recent results in causal machine learning. (Kilbertus et al.,
2018) argues that causal mechanisms are typically continuous but most learning problems such as classification
are anti-causal. Strong generalization is limited in anti-causal learning and access to the causal model can
remove such limitations. Further, the lack of resilience to adversarial example is hypothesized to be the result
of learning in anti-causal direction. We use the attributions and saliency map to identify the cause of the
current decision of the machine learning model, and then construct a generator that can mask high-attribution
features to explore the causal neighborhood of the input and observe model’s behavior in this neighborhood.
While learning is still in the anti-causal direction, we add a layer of causal deliberative System 2 that reasons
in forward direction to evaluate the robustness of the obtained attribution.
The connection between attributions and training with adversarial examples has also been recently
studied (Chalasani et al., 2018) where the authors note that adversarial training leads to feature concentration.
They use the same attribution method of Integrated Gradients as our approach and report that adversarial
training achieved much better feature concentration than traditional L1 regularization. We study the connection
between attribution and robustness from a different perspective. Our observation in this paper suggests that the
features in adversarial inputs responsible for the wrong decision hinge on a relatively concentrated small set
of features and hence, are not robust to masking of features with high attribution magnitude. Our result and
the observation in (Chalasani et al., 2018) are complementary. This suggests two parallel and independent
approaches to increase robustness of a two-level cognition system. First, the System 1 comprising of the
machine learning model can be made independently robust via adversarial training or direct regularization to
concentrate the attributions, and second, System 2 can rely on masking high attribute features to check the
robustness of the model’s explanation for a specific instance.
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3 Approach
Figure 2 shows the overall architecture of the proposed approach. The anti-causal learning used in tasks such
as classification are often not robust to adversarial changes (Chalasani et al., 2018). Such models can be viewed
as intuitive System 1 that makes fast decisions. While these systems can definitely be made more robust and
resilient to adversarial methods (Madry et al., 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018), our focus is on analyzing the
attributions generated from the ML models on the inputs to detect their adversarial nature. We use image
benchmarks as inputs and pixels as the features. But our approach can be adapted to other application domains
and to more higher-level abstract features. As discussed earlier, there are several recently proposed attribution
methods that can be used to obtain the positive and negative attribution of different features for a given decision
of the machine learning model. For a given neural network machine learning model M and input x, the
attribution for the model output M(x) is computed for the features F1, F2, . . . , Fk of the input.
As recognized in recent comparison of feature-attribution methods (Adebayo et al., 2018), several feature
attribution methods have quirks which obscure the impact of features on the model output, and evaluation of
different attribution methods is challenging. In a recent paper (Sundararajan et al., 2017), the authors identify
several axioms that must be satisfied by a sound attribution method, and in particular propose a specific method
that satisfies these axioms, which they call Integrated Gradients. We adopt this method in our study. The
attribution in Integrated Gradient uses the notion of a baseline input. For example, the all dark image can be
selected as a baseline for attribution over images. The attribution is then defined as the path integral of the
gradients along the straight-line path from the baseline x′ to the input x, that is, the attribution for the i-th
feature is
IG(Fi(x)) = (xi − x′i)×
∫ 1
α=0
∂iM(x
′ + α(x− x′))dα
where ∂iM(·) denotes the gradient of M(·) along the i-th feature dimension.
We adopt a simple masking model for causal generation of new inputs from the features. Given an input x
with baseline x′, the masking generator G can select a subset of n ≤ k features M = {m1,m2, . . .mn} to be
masked and generate a new input G(x,M) such that Fi(G(x,M)) = Fi(x) for i 6∈M and Fi(G(x,M)) =
Fi(x
′) for i ∈M . For example, if the baseline is a dark image and the features are pixels of the image, the
masking model selects a set of pixels M of an input image and makes them dark. We use the attribution over
features and this masking model to define a causal neighborhood of the input x as follows:
Definition: Given an input x with features F1, F2, . . . , Fk and the corresponding attributions IG(F1(x)),
IG(F2(x)), . . . , IG(Fk(x)), we sort the features in decreasing order of their attribution Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjk such
that the attributions IG(Fj1(x)) ≥ IG(Fj2(x)) ≥ . . . ≥ IG(Fjk(x)). We define a δ causal neighborhood
of the input x for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 by constructing new inputs G(x,M) obtained via masking features M ⊆
{Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjdδke}, that is,
Nδ(x) = {G(x,M)|M ⊆ {Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjdδke}}
We say that an input (benign or adversarial) is δ robust with respect to its attributions if the machine learning
model produces the same output on all inputs inNδ(x). We restrict our study to positive attributions. Negative
attributions can be used for counterfactual robustness testing but such a counterfactual testing will need to
be done with respect to all alternate decisions. We denote this restricted neighborhood as N+δ (x) where all
features Fji in M are guaranteed to have positive attributions, that is, IG(Fji(x
M )) > 0 for all xM ∈ N+δ (x).
The following theorem follows from the monotonicity of M with respect to the inclusion of features positive
attributes:
Theorem: If the outputs of a machine learning model M on an input x and for some input in its causal
neighborhood xM ∈ N+δ (x) are different, then the model M also produces different outputs on the input x
and G(x,Mδ) where Mδ = {Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjdδke}.
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Algorithm 1 Evaluate robustness ρ of machine learning model M on input x with granularity 
1: Using Integrated Gradient, compute the attributions of the features F1, F2, . . . , Fk of x as
IG(F1(x)), IG(F2(x)), . . . , IG(Fk(x))
2: Sort the features in decreasing order of attributions Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjk such that the attributions
IG(Fj1(x)) ≥ IG(Fj2(x)) ≥ . . . ≥ IG(Fjk(x)).
3: Filter the features to keep only those with positive attributions Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjm such that IG(Fj1(x)) ≥
IG(Fj2(x)) ≥ . . . ≥ IG(Fjm(x)) > 0.
4: δ ← 
5: Mδ ← {Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjdme}
6: while M produces same outputs on x as well as on G(x,Mδ), and δ ≤ 1 do
7: δ ← δ + 
8: Mδ ← {Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjdδme}
9: end while
10: return ρ(M,x) = δ
This monotonicity enables us to check the robustness of a machine learning model on an input in its causal
neighborhood by just considering the farthest input. If the model produces different output, then it is not
robust on this input. Algorithm 1 summarizes this robustness check procedure which forms the core of the
deliberative System 2.
We can lift the computation of the robustness of machine learning model M on input x to define the
attribution sensitivity on a dataset X as follows:
S(M,X, δ) = 1− |{x|x ∈ X and ρ(M,x) ≤ δ}||X|
where | · | denotes the size of the set. The central goal of the paper is to study the connection between
attributions and adversarial robustness, and to argue the need for Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2 cognition
for more robust perception. While such an approach will not create a fool-proof defense against adversarial
examples, it is an essential first-step towards building trusted high assurance intelligent agents. We accomplish
this by computing the attribution sensitivity on original datasets and adversarially perturbed datasets. An
effective adversarial attack must have smaller attribution sensitivity similar to original inputs to avoid detection.
.
4 Analysis Results
We perform the attribution sensitivity analysis on three datasets to test our hypothesis that adversarial examples
are less robust (more sensitive) to masking in the attribution space when compared to the robustness of original
images to such masking:
• MNIST images and adversarial datasets obtained using FGSM (with different epsilon bounds), DeepFool,
PGD and CW attack methods.
• ImageNet images and adversarial datasets obtained using FGSM (with different epsilon bounds),
DeepFool, PGD and CW attack methods.
• Physically realizable adversarial patch (Brown et al., 2017) and LaVAN (Karmon et al., 2018b) attack
applied to 1000 images from ImageNet. For adversarial patch attack we used a patch size of 25%for
two patch types: banana and toaster. For LaVAN we used baseball patch of size 50× 50 pixels.
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Figure 3: (Left) Percentage of changed labels and percentage of masked attributions for adversarial attacks FGSM,
DeepFool, CW, and PGD on MNIST dataset. (Right) Percentage of changed labels and fraction of masked pixels on
ImageNet database. FGSM attacks with different  = 2, 5, 10 are evaluated for ImageNet.
4.1 MNIST Dataset and Digital Attacks
The original MNIST images show attribution robustness where removing the top 10% attributions does not
change the decision of the model on 94% of the images. Even removing 20% of the attributions does not cause
change in the labels assigned to 81% of the MNIST images. In contrast, masking the top 20% attribution
has a much stronger impact on the adversarial images. As shown in Figure 3, this changes the assigned
labels of adversarial images generated using FGSM, DeepFool, CW and PGD by 72%, 67%, 53%, and 68%
respectively.
4.2 ImageNet Dataset and Digital Attacks
The masking of a small number of high-attribution pixels does not cause a change in the labels of the original
ImageNet images as shown in Figure 3. Labels assigned to 82% of ImageNet images remain unchanged when
pixels corresponding to top 0.1% of attributions are masked. The fraction of unchanged labels remains at
67% even when pixels corresponding to top 0.4% of attributions are masked. In contrast, 76%, 71% and 75%
of the images changed label on masking 0.4% of pixels corresponding to top attributions for the adversarial
examples generated using FGSM with different epsilon values. This percentage for PGD( = 2) was 71%,
97% for CW and 95% for DeepFool.
4.3 ImageNet Dataset and Physical Attacks
Using 1000 images from the ImageNet dataset, we created adversarial patch and LaVAN attacks for the
InceptionV3 deep learning model. For adversarial patch attack we used a patch size of 25% for two patch
types: banana and toaster. A total of 347 out of 1000 images were successfully perturbed and assigned banana
label on applying the banana patch. Corresponding number for the toaster patch was 376. We observe that
there was a change in label for 99.71% of images having the banana patch on masking top 0.4% of high
attribution pixels. Similarly, 98.14% of images having the toaster patch changed label on masking top 0.4% of
high attribution pixels. For LaVAN attack we used baseball patch of size 50× 50 pixels. A total of 747 out
of 1000 images were successfully perturbed and assigned baseball label. We observe that 99.20% of images
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having baseball patch changed label when we masked top 0.4% of attributions. Detection percentages for
various pixel masking percentages for images with banana, toaster and baseball patch are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: (Left) Percentage of correct labels and masked attributions for 1000 images from the ImageNet database is shown
in blue. Banana patch and toaster patch were generated using adversarial patch method (Brown et al., 2017). Baseball
patch was generated using LaVAN method (Karmon et al., 2018b). Dropping 0.4% of the attribution causes 99.71% of the
attacks based on banana patches to be detected, 98.14% of the attacks based on toaster patch to be detected and 99.20% of
the attacks based on baseball patch to be detected. (Right) Masking 0.4% of attributions causes nearly 80% of labels to
change for images with adversarial patches.
Figure 5: (From left to right) the original image with a label of yawl; masking its top 0.2% attribution; masking its top
4% of attribution; image with a banana patch generated using adversarial patch method; masking its top 0.2% attribution;
(rightmost) masking its top 4% of attribution. Most pixels are masked from the noise patch leading to a change in label.
Original images are robust to small pixel masking and retain their labels.
We observe that most of the high attribution pixels in adversarial images is localized in the patch and
masking these pixels leads to a change in the image label. An example of this behaviour can been seen for
adversarial patch and LaVAN methods in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. In Figure, 5 most of the masking is
localized around the banana patch; similarly, most of the masking is localized around the baseball patch in
Figure 6.
A smaller size of adversarial patch is more desirable as an attacker can apply it to more surfaces. In
our testing of adversarial patch method, 25% was the smallest patch size that could fool Inception classifier
consistently. We applied our method on various patch sizes ranging from 25% to 40% in increments of 5% to
test the robustness of our method. Results showing detection percentages for various patch sizes is presented in
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Figure 6: (From left to right) original image; masking its top 0.2% attribution; masking its top 2% of attribution; image
with a baseball patch generated using LaVAN method that causes the Inception deep neural net to label the entire image as
a baseball; masking its top 0.2% attribution; (rightmost) masking top 2% of its top attributions. Most pixels are again
masked from the noise patch leading to a change in label. Original images are robust to small pixel masking and retain
their labels.
the right of Figure 4. Smaller patches are relatively easier to detect due to high attribute feature concentration
suggesting a trade off in making attacks physically realizable and yet imperceptible, and makings it robust in
the attribution space.
5 Conclusion
We investigated the connection between the resilience to adversarial perturbations and the attribution-based
explanation of individual decisions generated by machine learning models. We observe that adversarial inputs
are not robust in attribution space, that is, masking a few features with high attribution leads to change in
decision of the machine learning model on the adversarial examples. In contrast, the natural inputs are robust
in attribution space. This observation can be used to devise a new defense approach for machine learning
models that uses attribution and incremental masking for filtering out adversarial examples. We propose such
a deliberative masking based analysis approach as System 2 of Kahneman’s two layer cognition system with
the actual machine learning model serving as System 1. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on
a set of benchmarks that include diffused digital perturbations as well as physically realizable perturbations.
The physically realizable adversarial perturbations are often localized; hence, they are easier to detect using
attributions. Further, attribution-based defense is agnostic to the attack method and also independent of the
training data. Instead, it relies on analysis of the result and the attribution generated by a machine learning
model on a specific input.
Our approach can make machine learning models more resilient to adversarial attacks because fooling this
two layer cognition system requires not only attacking the original model but also ensuring that the attribution
generated for the adversarial example is similar to the original examples. Both System 1 and System 2 must
be simultaneously compromised for a successful adversarial attack. Our experimental results indicate that
the current adversarial attack methods are not able to achieve this. The adversarial inputs generated by the
state-of-the-art attack methods such as DeepFool, FGSM, CW and PGD are able to fool a machine learning
model but they are not robust in the attribution space. New attack methods must be evaluated by not only
measuring the observed loss of accuracy but also evaluating their robustness in attribution space.
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